Infinity in Early Modern Philosophy by Ohad Nachtomy & Reed Winegar

Author:Ohad Nachtomy & Reed Winegar
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9783319945569
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

As in the case of Descartes’s wax and the stone, we begin our epistemic trajectory with an idea of a mode. What we then note are two things, first that it is a mode, i.e., expresses God’s nature in a certain and determinate way. Second, we notice that all ideas share a nature, or as Spinoza says we notice that all ideas involve thought. That is, we come to recognize not only that it is a mode, but that it is a mode of thought. Therefore, given that modes express God’s nature, ideas qua ideas express God’s nature and are conceived through it—because they depend on it, and the nature they express is Thought. Ideas then, must be conceived through Thought. Once we do this, we can come to appreciate how all ideas follow from God. Spinoza importantly thinks showing that Extension is an attribute of God proceeds exactly along the same lines .

Yet another point of access to this conclusion is the following; my initial self-awareness of my thought or the sensing of body as affected (2A2 and 2A4) might lead me to think that I am an independent thing, have a free will, etc. However, even this highly confused conception indicates that there is a diversity of things, despite utter confusion about their nature. As in Descartes, the reality of confusion indicates the existence of multiplicity. It is an integral part of our epistemic journey that it is self-evident that there is diversity of thought (we have many ideas) and bodies (we sense our bodies affected by other bodies). In other words, the plurality of things is not something to be proven, it is given immediately, albeit confusedly. This given-ness does not imply an ad hoc assertion of the existence of finite modes. That I am immediately aware that I think and that I sense my body affected does not entail that either one of these states is conceived through itself, or conversely that I cannot conceive its causes . Quite the contrary, the instant I begin comprehending this circumstance I must conceive myself (as a thinking thing or as an extended thing) through something else. To conceive an affection is precisely to conceive the relation of that which is being affected and that which is doing the affecting. If finite modes were established by brute force, they would be unintelligible: we would not be able to track their causes. A core theme, however, in Part Two of the Ethics is to show how modes must and can be conceived through their causes and their attributes. Furthermore, when done fully, not only do I conceive myself through my causes, but I also see the way in which I follow from the infinite substance along with all the other finite modes .

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